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Abstract
BACKGROUND
The UN Replacement Migration report (2000) had a significant impact in academic and
civil society. Its approach consisted of estimating the migration volumes required to
mitigate the effects of population decline and ageing. The volume of migrants required
to prevent population decline and sustain the working-age population was not
particularly high, but the vast number of migrants needed to maintain the potential
support ratio was highlighted as an unrealistic goal.
OBJECTIVES
In this paper the UN exercise is revisited and updated by deploying the concept of
prospective age to overcome a strict chronological definition of the working-age
population. The replacement migration approach is developed from a new European
perspective, the temporal series is extended for an additional decade, and alternative
operative age-group definitions are compared by projecting replacement migration
estimations according to both classic (conventional) and dynamic (prospective) age
limits.
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CONCLUSIONS
The key conclusions of the original UN publication are reasserted. In many countries
the replacement migration volumes needed to sustain the decline in total population and
working-age population are of an order of magnitude similar to recent observed
migration. However, even under the prospective-age approach the halt of the ageing
process – expressed as the maintenance of the current potential support ratio – remains
an unrealistic target.
CONTRIBUTION
We propose the deployment of the prospective-age concept to define dynamic age
limits in the definition of working-age population. Because the prospective-age concept
is flexible it will be possible to explore other dimensions from this perspective in the
future, increasing the analytical potential of replacement migration estimations as a
valuable contribution to the demographic ageing debate.
1. Introduction
The Replacement Migration report (UN 2000) received a great deal of attention from
both academic and civil society (Coleman 2002; Teitelbaum 2004). Although the
United Nations (UN) publication has been the object of severe criticism, it nevertheless
established the concept of replacement migration in the ageing debate. The report
presented estimates of the replacement migration needed to: (a) maintain the size of the
total population, (b) maintain the size of the working-age population (aged 15 to 64),
and (c) maintain the potential support ratio (PSR), i.e., the ratio of the working-age
population (aged 15 to 64 years) to old-age population (65 years or older). An
unavoidable reduction in the ratio of working-age to old-age populations emerged as
one of the core future challenges for economies and their social security systems, with
migration unable to prevent this progression.
This paper revisits the UN proposal almost twenty years after its original
publication. In our view, because subsequent studies and discussions have focused on
the goal of the potential support ratio the discussion of replacement migration has
become severely skewed. The UN itself originally presented this specific scenario as
unrealistic.
Through reaffirming the relevance of replacement migration to demographic
ageing research, we propose incorporating the prospective-age concept into
replacement migration estimations. Calculating and integrating prospective age gives a
new paradigm for conceptualizing population ageing and operationalizing dynamic age
limits in the definition of working-age populations.
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In this study we revisit and update the UN proposal by assessing replacement
migration estimations according to both conventional and prospective-age limits. We
adopt a European perspective, focusing on the Western and Southern European
countries considered in the original study (United Kingdom, Germany, France, and
Italy), to which we add Spain. Spain is the fifth most populated country in the EU (thus
one of the ‘Big Five’) and registered the highest immigration inflows in the European
Union over the 2002–2005 period (Arango 2005). In addition, the analysed period
extends until 2060.
The paper contains five subsequent sections. In the first we review the literature on
replacement migration and prospective age, before presenting our research
methodology in the second. In the third section we compare the observed net migration
volumes and UN replacement migration estimations for 1995–2015 and present
replacement migration estimations for 2015–2060 according to both conventional and
prospective-age concepts. In the fourth section we readdress the replacement migration
debate under this innovative perspective, and then close with our conclusions.
2. Theoretical framework
2.1 Replacement migration: Main approaches
Replacement migration can be defined as the volume of migrants needed to achieve
specific demographic goals. This topic gained popularity at the beginning of the 21st
century following the publication of the UN report (UN 2000). This report estimated
the volume of migrants needed to offset the effect on population volumes and structures
of low fertility and high life expectancy over the period 1995–2050 for eight countries
(Germany, Korea, France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, Russia, and the United
States), as well as for Europe and the then 15-member European Union. Two of the
main goals, maintaining the volume of the total and of the working-age population,
appeared feasible, while one was deemed impossible: sustaining the ageing process by
maintaining the potential support ratio (PSR) at 1995 levels (UN 2000).
The authors of the UN report concluded that the size of the total population could
be maintained until 2050 by net migration inputs of similar magnitude to those already
observed in the countries under review. The working-age population could only be
maintained by significantly increasing the net migration values. However, keeping the
potential support ratio constant at 1995 levels would require impossible volumes of
migrants, subsequently leading this scenario to be repeatedly deemed “demographically
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unrealistic”.6 The UN report did discuss several alternatives to deal with the
unavoidable population ageing process, such as changes in the retirement age, increases
in labour participation, and changes in the social security contributions and benefits
associated with working and retired people. In the European Union (15 countries in
1995), 863,000 migrants per year would be necessary to maintain the population size
until 2050, with 1,447,000 required to sustain the working-age population and
12,736,000 migrants needed to maintain the PSR (the “unrealistic” scenario) (UN
2000).
The report reached two main conclusions, which have since remained remarkably
consistent across replacement migration studies. The first is that a reasonable increase
in net migration can delay the implications of an ageing population, whether by
ensuring stability or by slowing the decrease in total and working-age populations. The
second is that increasing migration inputs will not reverse the population-ageing
process. According to the UN, contemporary societies will have to face the advantages
and disadvantages associated with population ageing, updating their work–life and
retirement-related social policies and programmes while simultaneously reinforcing
their immigrant integration policies (UN 2000). The report stated repeatedly that the
replacement migration volumes necessary to maintain the PSR were unrealistic, and
computed that the alternative retirement age needed to achieve this goal would in most
cases be above 75 years of age.
The UN exercise, often taken as a recommendation for future population policies,
led to a broad-reaching debate and was heavily criticised by several authors. The major
critique pointed to the exceptionally large number of migrants required to achieve the
projected targets. This argument was particularly strong in Coleman’s paper, entitled
“Why everyone is going to have to live in Korea” (Coleman 2002). Coleman argued
that maintaining the Korean PSR at the 1995 level would require the world’s entire
population to live in Korea by 2050. Coleman perceived the UN report as catastrophist
and linked it to his concerns over the ethnic diversification of Europe and the United
States as a consequence of high immigration, low fertility, and increased emigration of
resident populations (Coleman 2006). He considered that the report dismissed negative
implications of high immigrant inflows regarding social conflict, social cohesion, and
national identity (Coleman 2002).
Although the replacement migration concept became associated with an
unreachable amount of migration, the impossible magnitude of the required migration
was clearly a consequence of the UN scenario for sustaining the PSR – the “unrealistic”
6 The UN report was particularly clear on this matter: “Readers should keep in mind that the results of
scenario VI are for illustrative purposes only” (UN 2000: 3). This warning was repeatedly stated as a note to
all the tables setting out the results for the different countries and regions: “Scenario VI is considered to be
demographically unrealistic” (UN 2000).
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UN goal. While the UN report recognized that the estimates for maintaining total
population and working-age population size was relatively high, they might
nevertheless be considered a temporary situation as they would be “considerably lower
in the future, irrespective of migration flows” (UN 2000: 60).
The UN report also received criticism from authors alleging an overvaluation of
the role of migration, while broadly ignoring the innovative capacity of societies (see
Saczuk 2013 for a review). For example, some researchers disagreed with approaching
population declines only from a negative perspective and also pointed out the lack of
explanations in the methodological options adopted (Espenshade 2001; Coleman 2002).
Espenshade (2001) also criticised the UN’s almost exclusively demographic approach
to the ageing process, disregarding the economic and other social science perspectives
when framing the problem. Meyerson (2001) contested the lack of environmental issues
in the UN report, although the demographic trends and the solutions proposed did hold
implications in this regard. Saczuk (2003: 12) considered that the report, despite trying
to deal with “unavoidable economic problems in the future, does not take into
consideration any solutions other than demographic.”
Despite such criticisms, new studies have extensively explored the concept,
discussing its implications within the context of population ageing. In some cases they
apply the UN methodology (e.g., Vishenevsky 2000; Hablicsek and Tóth 2002; Rosa,
Seabra, and Santos 2004; Burcin, Drbohlav, and Kucera 2005; Bouvier 2001; Keely
2009; Saczuk 2013), whilst in others they enlarge and enrich the simulations of
replacement migration (Bijak, Kupiszewska, and Kupiszewski 2008; Bijak et al. 2013;
Johansson and Rauhut 2006; Castro, Martins, and Silva 2015; Peixoto et al. 2017).
For example, Bijak and collaborators present an extended international comparison
using the UN methodology for 27 European countries (Bijak, Kupiszewska, and
Kupiszewski 2008; Bijak et al. 2013). For the 2002–2052 period they compute the
replacement migration necessary to prevent population decline and the maintenance of
three population ratios: the classic potential support ratio (PSR), the economic elderly
support ratio (EESR) (i.e., the ratio of the number of active persons to those aged 65 or
over), and the labour market support ratio (LMSR) (i.e., the ratio of the active
population to the inactive population). According to the authors, for all 27 European
countries an annual inflow of almost 35 million migrants would be required to keep the
PSR constant and about 26 million to maintain the EESR, dropping to 15 million to
support the LMSR. As a result, in 2052, immigrants and their descendants would
constitute around 72%, 67%, and 61% of the resident population, respectively. Thus,
the migration flows required to stop population ageing or its specific economic
consequences appear as unrealistic as in the original UN report.
Replacement migration studies have also progressively integrated non-
demographic dimensions. For example, some research projects – ESPON (Johansson
Craveiro et al.: A new European perspective applying the prospective age concept
1328 http://www.demographic-research.org
and Rauhut 2006), DEMOSPIN (Castro, Martins, and Silva 2015), and MIGSUB
(Peixoto et al. 2017) – estimate the replacement migration required to meet human
resource needs according to different socioeconomic scenarios. This interrelationship
between the demographic and the economic dimensions is explored (directly or
indirectly) through the working-age population concept in conjunction with other
variables, such as prospective economic growth and labour productivity.
The size of the working-age population is crucial to determining the extent of the
demographic decline and the corresponding need for replacement migration. The
working-age population encapsulates demographic (age structure), economic (active
population proxy), and political (retirement age limits) meanings. The way in which
this is defined becomes crucial to address the interplay between demography and other
dimensions. It is precisely to overcome the inaccuracies of the static demographic
definition of this concept across time that the prospective-age approach needs to be
introduced into the discussion.
2.2 Prospective age: New definitions for working-age and old-age populations
Sanderson and Scherbov (2005, 2007) introduced a new concept of age: prospective
age. Classic chronological age measures the number of years already lived, while
prospective age is an alternative measure of time that depends on remaining life
expectancy at a particular given age. Prospective age is thus derived from age-specific
life expectancy. As life expectancy increases over time, this age-specific life
expectancy becomes longer so that the same remaining life expectancy is reached at
chronologically older ages (Sanderson and Scherbov 2005). Furthermore, the authors
proposed a new definition of the old-age group as those with 15 years of remaining life
expectancy, and computed new prospective old-age dependency ratios (Sanderson and
Scherbov 2008). The authors chose this threshold because it was the remaining life
expectancy at 65 years in the 1970s in several low-mortality countries (Sanderson and
Scherbov 2015). It became the reference commonly adopted by prospective-age studies.
The prospective-age concept triggered a line of research that has resulted in
important developments since 2005. It is currently being integrated into a new research
paradigm, The Characteristics Approach, which strives to conceptualize population
ageing beyond the chronological dimension, fostering new multidimensional measures
of ageing (Sanderson and Scherbov 2013).
This paper proposes the deployment of the prospective-age concept in
international replacement migration studies. However, we would stress that a similar
perspective was implicit in the original UN report, which pointed to new working-age
limits as a means of stabilizing the PSR until 2050. For example, in the observed
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European countries the age limit needs raising to 72 in the United Kingdom, to 74 in
France, and to 77 in Germany and Italy (UN 2000).
In this paper the prospective definition of old age systematically serves to define
the limits of the working-age and old-age population groups in accordance with the
expected life expectancies of men and women between 2015 and 2060. By allowing the
progressive calibration of the concept alongside the gains in life expectancy, the
prospective working-age group provides an alternative indicator of potential labour
force availability in any population. It also constitutes a critical review of the evolution
of support indexes across both time and space.
3. Methodology
This research has a European perspective and covers the period from 2015 to 2060. It
includes all four European countries in the original UN study with the addition of
Spain, in order to take into account the five largest Western and Southern European
countries (Germany, United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain). These countries comprised
about 62% of the EU-28 population in 2015. They furthermore illustrate a significant
variety of demographic situations, particularly as regards their migration histories,
ranging from countries in which there is a long tradition of immigration to others in
which the change from emigration to immigration occurred only relatively recently
(e.g., Van Mol and De Valk 2016; Dumont 2015).
Replacement migration is estimated through both classic (chronological) and
dynamic (prospective) definitions of working-age and old-age populations. There are
three main methodological steps: (1) demographic projections for the five countries in a
zero-migration scenario, based on recent Eurostat assumptions of fertility and mortality;
(2) computation of the prospective working-age thresholds, also according to Eurostat
assumptions of mortality; and (3) replacement migration estimations, according to both
classic and prospective limits.
Baseline data for demographic projections comes from official population data
from the five countries under study, collected by Eurostat (Eurostat 2014). To generate
demographic projections between 2015 and 2060 we pair this baseline data with
Eurostat central scenario assumptions for future age-specific fertility rates and age-
specific mortality rates for men and women, for each country, according to the cohort
component method. We present a summary of these assumptions in Table 1. Based on
these premises, we then define the prospective-age limit for the working-age population
of men and women in each country (age with 15 years of remaining life expectancy),
with working age being defined as between 20 and the age limit at which remaining life
expectancy is 15 years.
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Table 1: Assumptions of fertility, life expectancy at birth, and prospective-age
limits, by country (2015–2060)
Life expectancy Age with 15 years of remaining lifeexpectancy
Fertility rate Male Female Male Female
2015 2060 2015 2060 2015 2060 2015 2060 2015 2060
Germany 1.49 1.64 78.0 84.9 83.0 89.0 68.7 74.0 72.3 76.9
Spain 1.33 1.88 79.7 85.9 85.3 90.3 70.0 74.8 74.0 77.9
France 1.96 1.99 78.7 85.5 85.0 90.3 70.4 74.9 74.6 78.1
Italy 1.34 1.60 79.9 85.9 84.6 90.0 69.7 74.4 73.4 77.6
United Kingdom 1.80 1.86 78.9 85.4 82.7 89.0 69.4 74.4 72.3 77.1
Source: Eurostat and own calculations.
In this study, replacement migration estimations were computed annually in order
to maintain: (a) the total population size, (b) the working-age population size, and (c)
the potential support ratio. These figures were then estimated according to the classic
and prospective definitions of the working-age population: the working-age population
defined as 20–64 years7 (a slight adaptation of the original UN definition, 15–64,
adopted for comparison), versus the working age population defined as the interval
between 20 years and the age limit at which remaining life expectancy is 15 years. In
our exercise we accept negative volumes of replacement migration when required to
maintain the established demographic goal (the UN exercise did not consider negative
net migration, as the minimum replacement migration level was zero). We also
incorporated a set of assumptions concerning the age and sex structure of the migrant
population: We adopted the same age structure as that used in the UN exercise
(considering both sexes) and considered the migrant flow sex-balanced (50% of each
sex). The fertility and mortality rates attributed to migrants are equal to those of the
resident population.
Despite the methodological care used in this exercise, a couple of caveats must be
taken into consideration. First, we used available data from EUROSTAT and the UN
that is of debatable quality, and adopted a set of assumptions regarding future mortality
and fertility rates: hypotheses that, inevitably, will drift away from reality. Second, the
specificities of migration type (economic migrants, family migration, refugee flows,
student migration, etc.) and the complex integration process of migrants in destination
societies (such as the dynamic of migrants’ fertility and mortality patterns) were not
included in the model. Though these are relevant issues, they add unnecessary
complexity and clearly exceed the scope of our analysis: this exercise aims only to
estimate the order of magnitude of replacement migration.
7 The prospective working-age definition used by Sanderson and Scherbov (2008).
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4. Results
Before presenting the results returned from this analysis, the real net migration volumes
for 1995–2015 are compared with the replacement migration estimations from the
original UN study for the same period. This is followed by an assessment of the classic
and the prospective estimations of the replacement migration necessary to maintain the
working-age population size and the potential support ratio between 2015 and 2060 in
the five countries under analysis.
4.1 Observed net migration volumes and UN replacement migration estimations
(1995–2015)
In the original UN report the projections covered the period 1995–2050, showing
figures for net migration by quinquennium. We can now compare the actual observed
net migration and the UN estimates for the four EU countries included in the 2000
report for the two decades between 1995 and 2015 (see Table 2).
Table 2: Observed net migration and UN estimates for replacement migration
to keep constant the total population, working age population, and
potential support ratio, by country, 1995–2015, in thousands
Observed net migration
Eurostat (1996–2015)
UN replacement migration estimates (1995–2015)
Country Constant total population Constant working-agepopulation
Constant potential
support ratio
United Kingdom 4,231 0 940 10,825
Germany 4,620 4,495 6,105 36,670
France 1,874* 0 895 16,640
Italy 4,538 3,155 4,945 23,910
Note: *Missing data in the years 1996 and 1997.
Source: UN (2000) and Eurostat (net migration plus statistical adjustment).
According to Eurostat, the total volume of cumulative net migration between 1995
and 2015 in the United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy was about 4.5 million in each.
France, however, returned the significantly lower number of circa 1.9 million.
The required replacement migration for the basic demographic goal of sustaining
total population size was always overtaken by the magnitude of incoming migration
flows. Actual migration greatly exceeded the number required to keep the working-age
population stable in the United Kingdom (more than 4 million vs. less than 1 million
required) and in France (1.8 million vs. less than 1 million). In Italy, net migration was
almost equal to the required number (4.5 million vs. 4.9 million). However, in Germany
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the actual net migration figures between 1995 and 2015 fell below the UN estimation
(4.6 vs. 6.1 million). Nevertheless, observed net migration accounted for about 76% of
the volume required to keep the working-age population constant.
Nonetheless, in all these countries observed net migration was much lower than
the estimated volume required to keep the potential support ratio constant. This is
hardly surprising, as this goal was always deemed unattainable, even by the original
UN publication (UN 2000).
4.2 Updating replacement migration estimations (2015–2060): Classic and
prospective approaches
Although the comparison between reality and the UN estimates for the 1995–2015
period supports the importance of replacement migration in the four European
countries, our approach assesses how replacement migration responds to new
definitions of working age based on the prospective-age concept.
The next paragraphs compare the volumes of replacement migration incorporating
dynamic age groups based on the prospective-age concept (with the working age
defined as between 20 years and the age limit at which the remaining life expectancy is
15 years) with a static definition for this age group. Table 3 presents the average annual
net migration in 1995–2015 and the annual net replacement migration estimates while
keeping constant the total population and the working age population between 2015 and
2060, applying both static and prospective definitions.
The annual net migration needed to maintain the total population size between
2015 and 2060 exceeds the real annual average values observed between 1995 and
2015 in two countries: Germany (302,000 net migrants needed, compared with the
231,000 recorded in recent decades) and Italy (249,000 net migrants per year needed,
compared to the 227,000 arriving annually in the recent past). The average figures for
the two last decades are close to 77% and 91% of the estimates for the replacement
migration required to keep the population total constant in these two countries,
respectively.
In the remaining countries the replacement migration estimates are clearly lower
than the observed volume of net migration. In the United Kingdom the total of migrants
needed to maintain the population size constant is only about 2.4% of that observed in
recent decades (5,000 vs. 212,000). In Spain the estimated replacement migratory
volumes are also much lower than recently observed trends, standing at around 29% of
the former (79,000 vs. 273,000).
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Table 3: Observed average annual net migration and replacement migration
estimates for keeping the total population and the working age
population constant (classic and prospective limits) in 2015–2060,
by country, in thousands
Country
Observed annual net
migration (1996–2015)
Replacement migration (2015–2060)
Constant total
population
Constant static
working-age population
Constant prospective
working-age population
Sum Annualaverage Sum
Annual
average Sum
Annual
average Sum
Annual
average
United Kingdom 4,231 212 225 5 6,890 150 1,705 37
Germany 4,620 231 13,898 302 23,547 512 15,546 338
France 1,874* 104 –2,047 –44 2,413 52 –798 –17
Italy 4,538 227 11,453 249 18,025 392 14,272 310
Spain 5,457 273 3,615 79 10,487 228 8,181 178
Note: *Missing data in the years 1996 and 1997.
Source: Average annual net migration 1996–2015: Eurostat (net migration plus statistical adjustment); Replacement migration 2015–
2060: own calculations.
The French case stands out: This is the only country under study in which to keep
the total stable between 2015 and 2060 there needs to be outflow from the projected
residents. This French demographic specificity is related to immigration from the late
1950s to the 1970s, which reinforced the relative weight of fertile ages (Aubry et al.
2005). Additionally, and more importantly, they seem to reflect public population
policies that have been implemented in this country at least since the Second World
War (Rosental 2011). In France, maintaining a pro-natalist policy has ensured the
continuation of a young age structure, at least within the European context, as well as a
considerable demographic dynamic (Aubry et al. 2005).
Estimates of the working-age population vary according to the static and
prospective-age limits applied (Table 3). As would be expected, when using the
conventional perspective (working age: 20–64 years old) the migration volume needed
to maintain the working-age population stable is larger than that needed to maintain the
total population size. Again, in Germany and Italy the replacement migration volumes
estimated for 2015–2060 clearly exceed the observed annual averages in 1995–2015
(512,000 vs. 231,000 and 392,000 vs. 227,000 respectively). In the United Kingdom,
France, and Spain the estimates of the required net migration flows are significantly
lower than the observed net migration during the 1996 to 2015 period: in the United
Kingdom the required net migration flow is about 71% of the observed net migration
(150,000 vs. 212,000), in Spain it is roughly 84% (228,000 vs. 272,000), and in France
it is 50% (52,000 vs. 104,000).
The introduction of the concept of prospective age provides dynamic definitions of
the age groups. If the operational definition of the elderly is set at 15 years of remaining
life expectancy, then the working-age group increases and the elderly group decreases.
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Therefore, the volume of replacement migration needed to keep the prospective
working-age group (as well as the prospective potential support ratio) constant is
smaller than the estimates returned by the classic age limits. In other words, as the
extent of the working-age population increases, and people continue their presence in
the labour market further into the life cycle, meeting the shortfall requires fewer
replacement migrants.
According to our calculations, in France no additional migrants would be needed
to sustain the prospective working-age population size and total population size. In the
United Kingdom the replacement migration needed to maintain the prospective
working-age level would be about 37,000 per year (about one-quarter of the 150,000
resulting from the traditional definition). In all the other countries there are significant
differences, even if not so large: 338,000 vs. 512,000 in Germany (that is, two-thirds)
and almost 80% in Italy and Spain (310,000 vs. 392,000 and 178,000 vs. 228,000
respectively). In comparison to the actual flows registered in 1995–2015, the magnitude
of the estimated prospective-age replacement migration is significantly lower than the
migration actually observed in France, the United Kingdom, and Spain, but remains
around 40% higher in Germany and Italy.
The global volume of replacement net migration for the 2015–2060 period
conceals considerable annual variation (Figure 1). Previous replacement migration
exercises have shown this kind of pattern when reporting both the mid- and long-term
effects derived from the current 2015 age structures and replacement migration cycles.
Replacement migration cycles interlink with the indirect medium-term effects of
migration flows. As replacement migrants become included in the resident population
the age structure changes, gradually becoming younger. The migrant input represents
an important contribution to births and growth in the young population; subsequently,
these young people reach working (and fertile) age, thereby reducing the required
replacement migration total. However, in the long run the migrant population also ages,
increasing the need for new migrant inputs to compensate for their transition from the
working-age population to the old-age population.
When considering the migration evolution needed to ensure a constant working-
age population in accordance with the static definition, downward movements are
clearly visible in the United Kingdom during the mid-2030s, in Germany during the
whole of the 2030s, in Italy during the 2040s, and in Spain after 2040. When applying
prospective-age groups the shape of the cycle remains roughly the same but smoother
and postponed in time, as would be expected. In the United Kingdom, however, the
required prospective-age migration volume is rather low and has correspondingly
shorter replacement migration cycles. France demonstrates a more peculiar evolution in
the annual replacement migration estimation, as reported above.
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Figure 1: Annual net migration needed to keep constant total population,
classic working-age population, and prospective working-age
population between 2015 and 2060, by country (in thousands)
Note: Estimated replacement migration to keep constant total population, classic working-age population, and prospective working-
age population between 2015 and 2060. The horizontal line denotes the average net migration values for the 1995–2015 period for
each country.
Source: Own calculations.
Finally, despite the many previous arguments about the unrealistic goal of keeping
the potential support ratio constant, we have also computed replacement migration to
achieve this target, simply in order to confirm that, even with the prospective-age
concept, this still remains an unattainable goal.
Table 4 presents the observed average annual net migration in 1996–2015 and the
annual net replacement migration estimates for keeping the PSR constant, considering
both the classic ratio and that deploying prospective age. As expected, the migration
inputs required to keep the ratio between working-age and old-age populations constant
still result in “demographically unrealistic” scenarios (UN 2000). Even if the
prospective-age concept significantly decreases the required migration volumes (by
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around 45%–60% in four cases and by 82% in Germany), the amount of net migration
undoubtedly remains beyond the scope of the magnitude that actual migration achieved,
even for the French case. Migration cannot be approached as a unique solution to
ageing demographics.
Table 4: Observed average annual net migration and replacement migration
estimates to keep the PSR constant (static and prospective-age
limits), 2015–2060, by country (in thousands)
Country Observed net migration
(1996–2015)
Replacement migration estimates (2015–2060)
Constant PSR Constant prospective PSR
Sum Annual average Sum Annual average Sum Annual average
United Kingdom 4,231 212 98,691 2,145 39,306 854
Germany 4,620 231 111,899 2,433 15,546 345
France 1,874* 104 83,310 1,811 36,175 786
Italy 4,538 227 78,544 1,707 39,821 866
Spain 5,457 273 92,479 2,010 50,521 1,098
Note: *Missing data in the years 1996 and 1997.
Source: Average annual net migration 1996–2015: Eurostat (net migration plus statistical adjustment); Replacement migration 2015–
2060: own calculations.
5. Discussion: The replacement migration debate twenty years on
The key idea of the original UN (2000) exercise was to undertake an assessment of the
net migration volumes needed to achieve specific demographic goals, namely to sustain
against decline and ageing in post-transitional populations. This was a geographically
localized solution, as it is impossible to discuss the replacement migration concept for
the planet. However, it did envision generalization, as the ageing process is spreading
globally, driven by decreases in fertility and increases in life expectancy.
The main critique of the concept was the exceptional number of migrants required
to achieve the projected targets, particularly to maintain the potential support ratio, as
well as the neglect of other alternative solutions. However, in our opinion this criticism
must now be framed in a more cautious manner. In fact, in the UN report, as also
demonstrated in this paper, the volume of migration required in most countries to level
the total population size was of the same order of magnitude as actual net migration in
recent years. The amount of migration required to maintain the working-age population
– a proxy for the labour force – was higher, but nevertheless still within the scope of
recent migration levels for many countries.
The integration of migration inputs of this magnitude leads to overall positive
contributions, even if limited, to the economy, fiscal systems, and old age pension
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systems (e.g., Gil Alonso 2009), which partially offset concerns about implications
regarding social tensions and ethnic conflict. However, the recent increase in
xenophobia and anti-immigration and nationalist political discourses in Europe (e.g.,
Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky 2006; Rustenbach 2010; Eatwell and Goodwin
2018), and the perceived connection between terrorism and migrant communities (e.g.,
Fekete 2004), which tends to ignore the social roots of such problems, point to crucial
challenges that need addressing by social mobility and other policies.
However, in addition to contributing to the debate about the social impact and
challenges of estimated immigration volumes, this paper aims to discuss the
implications of the integration of the prospective-age concept (Sanderson and Scherbov
2005) in the rationale of replacement migration, thereby deriving further insight from
the UN conclusions. On the one hand, the notion of prospective age emphasizes the
postponement of old age, while on the other hand it suggests new contours to
demographic ageing, reflected in the indicators and needs of population replacement.
This dynamic approach presupposes a fluid view of life cycles and life events, as other
authors have also proposed (e.g., Blanchet and Toutlemonde 2008, 2011).
In this paper, as in previous replacement migration exercises, we report
noteworthy variability in the temporal series. In our estimates, these fluctuations –
especially in the replacement migration cycles – are discussed as an intrinsic feature of
population dynamics. Besides the annual random fluctuations, cycles are a significant
factor in demographic processes that result from the interactions between cohort and
life cycle events. Finding cycles in replacement migration estimations is not surprising.
In a simulation exercise in which the adjustment process to demographic goals begins
at the same exact moment for all countries, independent of their respective specific
contexts, replacement migration cycles are expected. Outside the simulations, migration
react to a much more complex set of factors than the precise targets in demographic
simulations. Furthermore, migration is extremely volatile – much more so than births
and deaths (e.g., Van Mol and De Valk 2016; Avdeev et al. 2011).
The exercise carried out, taking five major European countries as its empirical
focus for the 2015–2060 period, points to the same general conclusions as the original
UN report, even when using the prospective-age concept to derive dynamic definitions
of key age groups. The migration volumes needed to sustain the total population size
and the working-age population size are similar and sometimes lower than those
occurring in the recent past. Even when not totally reached they are reached to a large
extent, using either static or prospective-age definitions.
Notwithstanding this general conclusion regarding total and working-age
populations, the differences between countries are interesting. The United Kingdom’s
demographic sustainability appears to be easily ensured by the actual average migration
input when considering prospective-age estimates, suggesting that ageing pressures in
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the economy and social security can be attenuated by gradually widening the working
population age limits and accepting moderate levels of net migration. France stands out
as a very peculiar case, where the long-term pro-natalist policy commitment appears to
be contributing to a fertility rate high enough to ensure generational replacement in a
context of increased longevity and relatively low average migration inputs (1995–2015)
(e.g., Aubry et al. 2005). Spain also appears capable of a smooth evolution, given the
high volumes of its recent migration inputs. On the other hand, Germany and Italy
report the widest differences between replacement migration projections and observed
average migration volumes and appear to require higher migration in the future than in
the past.
This analysis is supported by the comparison of the replacement migration
simulations with EUROSTAT net migration data for 1996–2015. The accuracy of these
annual data series is limited: the figures are built on population census data that is
adjusted by population estimations driven by sample-based surveys in the inter-census
periods. The method is particularly flawed concerning emigrant flows, but also
excludes immigrants that are not in a regular situation, people that arrive and leave in
the inter-census period, and people that are not present in the country during the data
collection. Good practice in the production and use of migration data advises
combining several data sources, such as censuses, sample-based surveys, and
administrative data, to devise more accurate estimates (Global Migration Group 2017).
In sum, the reported historical experience of migration across countries may eventually
be over- or underestimated.
Future research should account for these limitations and explore the quantitative
and qualitative differences between these and other countries in order to discuss the
implications of population policy regarding both explaining and coping with different
rhythms in the progression of population ageing and in migration trends. For example,
regions such as North America, Central and Eastern Europe, and even Japan, will
provide rich and complementary demographic specificities.
Our review also reinstates the conclusion that the potential support ratio cannot be
realistically guaranteed by migration. This remains valid when considering the
prospective estimates for all cases considered, even France. In other words, the
apparently unavoidable reduction in the potential support ratio and the consequent
pressure on economic, social, and health systems cannot be met by strictly migration-
related measures. The final remarks of the UN original report in this respect remain
accurate: According to the UN, there are five possible responses to this challenge,
which we  deem still valid: adjustments in retirement ages, changes in retirement and
health systems, increased labour participation, changes in contributions made by
workers and employers to retirement and health systems, and programmes to integrate
migrants (UN 2000: 5).
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6. Final remarks
This paper revisits and updates the UN exercise on replacement migration (UN 2000),
extending the temporal series for one additional decade to cover the period 2015–2060
and integrating new operative age group definitions, using the concept of prospective
age. We restricted the geographical scope to Europe, although with a slight
modification: To gain a wider perspective we included Spain in order to incorporate the
five largest EU countries and a more diverse set of migration experiences into the
analysis.
Following this review we can reassert the key conclusions of the original UN
publication. Replacement migration plays a positive role in the consequences of
demographic ageing, moderating total population and working-age population declines.
The volume of net migrants needed to offset these consequences are realistic in that
they are of an order of magnitude similar to the recently observed migration patterns of
many countries. However, halting the ageing process, expressed in terms of maintaining
the current potential support ratio, remains an unrealistic target, given the sheer
volumes of migrants needed to attain this.
This study introduces some important innovations to the replacement migration
debate. The concept of prospective age is used to determine dynamic age limits when
defining the working-age population, an operative group key to accounting for the
interplay between the demographic, economic, and social spheres. This innovation
greatly moderates the migration inputs needed to ensure constant working-age
population sizes and even the potential support ratios, demonstrating how accounting
for gradual changes may calibrate the expected consequences of the ageing process.
Due to its flexibility, in the future the prospective-age concept could be used to
explore other dimensions. For example, operative age groups could be calibrated in
keeping with years of healthy life expectancy, or accounting for smoother transitions
from working life to retirement alongside decreases in working hours associated with
technological innovation, as hypothesised by Keynes in the 1920s (Keynes 1932). All
in all, this concept enlarges the analytical potential of replacement migration estimation
and is a valuable contribution to the demographic ageing debate.
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